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This paper considers the efficiency of a contestable natural monopoly if consumers are
heterogeneous and the monopolist can differentiate prices imperfectly. With restricted entry,
the standard result in this case is that the monopoly offers a menu of price-quantity
combinations which leads to the well-known 'no–distortion–at–the–top' pricing. Low demand
consumers are induced to consume less than their first-best quantity, while high demand
consumers buy a quantity where their marginal willingness to pay equals marginal cost. The
paper shows that this type of inefficiency may also appear in a contestable market. Depending
on cost and demand structures, first best efficiency can also be a sustainable equilibrium.
However, due to the existence of a continuum of equilibria, first best efficiency is never
guaranteed. Most notably, even a stable 'distortion–at–the–top' result is possible.
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In markets where resale by consumers is difficult or impossible, price differentiation between
consumers is a frequent empirical phenomenon. Examples of prices which depend on the
quantity purchased (non-linear prices) can be found in the electricity and airline industries, in
telephone services, in insurance and in many other areas. A great deal of theoretical analysis
has been devoted to such pricing strategies. The focus of most existing studies is the problem
of a profit maximising monopolist who is informed about the overall distribution of consumer
types but who cannot tell any single buyer's type. For important contributions see Spence
(1977), Mussa and Rosen (1978), Maskin and Riley (1984), Spulber (1993) and, for the case
of insurance, Stiglitz (1977).
The present paper is concerned with price discrimination between consumer groups in
the case of a contestable natural monopoly. A natural monopoly is defined as a market where,
because of decreasing average cost, cost efficiency requires only one active firm.
Contestability occurs if the market allows free and costless entry and exit of competitors
[Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982)]. This implies, among other things, that there are no sunk
costs of production.
Price discrimination in a contestable natural monopoly has received little attention in
the literature.1 This is surprising since the "paradigmatic contestable market" which is often
presented as an example of a contestable natural monopoly, namely airline service to a small
town, typically does show price differentiation between buyers which depends on the quality
of service.
Modeling price discrimination between consumer groups, the present paper addresses
the question of how efficient a contestable natural monopoly is compared to a non-contestable
monopoly on the one hand and to perfect competition on the other hand. It turns out that its
                                                
1 A few exceptions should be mentioned. Shaffer (1987) discusses two-part tariffs but does not consider the case
of different consumer types as the present paper does. Heyword and Pal (1993) discuss two-part pricing with
heterogenous consumers but do not consider the case of a natural monopoly with decreasing average cost. Allard,
Cresta and Rochet (1997) consider price discrimination and fixed cost in an insurance market with adverse
selection. Unlike the present paper, which considers firm specific fixed cost, these authors assume contract
specific fixed cost, which, in insurance markets, may lead to pooling equilibria.2
market equilibrium may be first best. However, stable equilibria with 'distortion-at-the-top'
and 'distortion-at-the-bottom' results are also possible.
I. A SIMPLE TWO-CONSUMER TYPE FRAMEWORK
The objective of the paper is to evaluate the efficiency properties of a contestable natural
monopoly when non-linear pricing is feasible. There are two possible reference points which
are useful in this evaluation. On the one hand, if fixed cost were absent, then perfect
competition would lead to marginal cost pricing without any price differentiation between
consumers.2 Another point of reference is the market outcome in a natural monopoly if new
entry of firms is excluded.3 The following section will reproduce the no-distortion-at-the-top
result in this case. Section III will then introduce contestability. Section IV adds some remarks
on insurance before Section V concludes.
I assume that there are two consumer groups, labelled H and L. The absolute number
of consumers in the respective groups is α H and α L. The utility of an individual from group
i = H, L depends on the quantity x consumed and on a total payment t made to the supplying
firm: Uxt ux t ii i ii i (,) () =− , where uu ii ', ' ' >< 00 . Note that x may also be interpreted as a
quality index in the case of a good of which every consumer demands only one unit. In the
airline service example, business class would imply a higher x than coach class. H's marginal
willingness to pay is supposed to exceed that of L for any level of x: uxux x HL '( ) '( ), >∀ .
This ensures that in (t,x)-space indifference curves of the two types cross only once (single
crossing condition). Reservation utility of consumer type i is given by Uu ii =− () 0 0. The cost
function C of a monopolist is assumed to consist of a fixed cost F (which is not sunk in the
case of the contestable monopoly) and constant marginal cost, c:
Cx x F c x x x x HH LL HH LL HH LL () () , () αα αα αα += + ⋅+ ∀+> 0
                                                
2 Compare Oren, Smith and Wilson (1983).
3 This is assumed in most of the existing literature.3
II. RESTRICTED ENTRY
Without potential competitors, the monopolist maximises profits by offering pairs of
quantities and payments (,) xt ii  for H type and L-type consumers (, ) iH L =  such that each
consumer type voluntarily chooses its designated contract. Formally, the firm's problem is:
{}
) ( max
, , , L L H H L L H H
x x t t
x x C t t
L H L H
α α α α π + − + = (1)
s.t.
ux t u LL L L () ( ) −− ≥ 00  (1a)
ux t u HH H H () ( ) −− ≥ 00 (1b)
ux t ux t HH H HL L () () −− −≥ 0 (1c)
ux t ux t LL L LH H () () −− −≥ 0 (1d)
First note that, from (1a), (1c) and the single crossing condition, (1b) is redundant and can be
eliminated. Then in an optimum (1a) must be binding. If this were not the case, the firm could
increase profits by marginally increasing tL and tH while keeping quantities constant and still
satisfying all other constraints. Further, (1c) must be binding. Otherwise, it would be possible
to increase the payment tH. Under the assumption that both groups are served in equilibrium,
the first order conditions are
uc H'= (2)
[] uc ux ux LH L H L L L '( / ) ' ( )' ( ) −= − > αα 0( 3 )
which imply underprovision for low demand consumers and the 'no–distortion–at–the–top'
result.
III. THE CONTESTABLE MONOPOLY
Now consider free entry and exit of firms.4 In many natural monopolies, in particular those
where significant sunk costs have to be incurred, the assumption of free entry and exit will be
much too optimistic. However, there clearly are markets with fixed costs but no sunk costs. In
the example of airline service to a small city, the wage bill for the pilot and the landing fee are
                                                
4 Potential entrants can use the same technology as an incumbent and can serve the same demand.4
largely independent of the number of passengers and therefore lead to fixed costs. However,
these costs are certainly not sunk. Another example of a market with economies of scale but
no sunk costs is mailing services. While it is economically more efficient if a certain area is
served by only one postman instead of two competing ones, the postman's wage is not a sunk
cost.
These examples indicate that the case of a contestable natural monopoly does indeed
deserve attention. Moreover, the framework of a contestable market is intellectually
interesting as it serves as a benchmark case which usually gives the most optimistic prediction
about the working of private markets.
For further analysis, it is helpful to first restate the equilibrium concept in a contestable
market (Baumol, Panzar and Willig 1982).5
Definition 1: In a sustainable industry configuration the following holds. (1) Aggregate
demand equals firms' aggregate output. (2) Each active firm's revenues are no less than its
production costs. (3) There must be no opportunities for entry that appear profitable to
potential entrants who regard the price-quantity offers made by incumbent firms as given.
Note that a situation where each consumer group is served by a different firm cannot
be a sustainable industry configuration. The fixed costs imply that a single firm jointly
supplying both consumer groups can always outperform two separate firms.
In the current setting, a sustainable configuration according to Definition 1 can only be
attained if the utility of one group is maximised given the utility of the other group and the
non-negativity constraint on profit. Either the utility level for the low demanders or the level
for the high demand consumer may be taken as given. In the following, assume a certain
utility level U0 for type L consumers. Then a sustainable industry configuration must be a
solution to the following problem:
max ( ) ux t HH H − (4)
s.t.
                                                
5This is a slight generalisation of the original definition to the case of non-linear pricing. In Baumol, Panzar,
Willig (1982), potential entrants regard incumbents' prices (instead of contracts) as fixed.5
ux t U LL L L () −− ≥
0 0 (4a)
ux t u HH H H () ( ) −− ≥ 00 (4b)
ux t ux t HH H HL L () () −− −≥ 0 (4c)
ux t ux t LL L LH H () () −− −≥ 0 (4d)
αα α α HH LL H H L L tt C xx +− + ≥ () 0 (4e)




Lux t ux t U ux t u
ux t ux t ux t ux t
tt C xx
HH H LL L HH H H
HH H HL L LL L LH H
HH LL H H H L
=− + − − + − −
+ − −+ + − −+ +
++ −+
() () () ( )







with the following first order conditions:
() ' ( )' ( )' ( ) 10 ++ − − = ΓΛ Ω Φ ux ux ux c HH HH LH H α (5)
ΘΛΩΦ ux ux ux c LL HL LL L '( ) '( ) '( ) −+− = α 0 (6)
−+ −+ + = () 10 ΓΛ Ω Φ α H (7)
−+−+ = ΘΛΩΦ α L 0( 8 )
Note that not every solution of (4) is necessarily a stable industry configuration. An entrant
could try to enter by increasing the utility level of H types. Although he could not attract L
types and therefore fixed costs are spread among a smaller number of consumers, H types
could still benefit from not subsidising L types. To rule out this case, the incumbent must not
subsidise L types 'too much'. More specifically, he must comply with
Restriction 1: A solution to the maximisation problem (4) is only a sustainable industry
configuration if tx c LL > , i.e. if low demanders bear at least the variable cost necessary to
produce the units they consume.
Finally, a solution to (4) must also rule out L-type consumers being better off if they are
served by a separate firm. This introduces
Restriction 2: A sustainable industry configuration requires Uu x c xF LL L L
0 ≥− ⋅ − () /
** α ,
where xL
*  is the first best quantity for L-type consumers.6
It is clear from the contestability of the market that (4e) must be binding with equality.
Moreover, positive sales to H types require that type H's participation constraint (4b) is
complied with (Γ= 0). Next, note that (4c) and (4d) cannot both be binding with equality. If
this were the case, tH > tL would follow from (4c) and (4d). However, given the single crossing
condition, it is not possible to find two contracts with different t's which are preferred equally
by both types. This contradiction shows that the two self-selection constraints (4c) and (4d)
cannot be binding simultaneously. Therefore, only three cases need to be distinguished. First,
neither (4c) nor (4d) is binding. In this case, there is a first best outcome. Second, we may
have solutions in which only the self-selection constraint for the H type (4c) is binding. Third,
only the self-selection constraint for the L type (4d) may be binding. Consider the optimality
conditions in the latter two cases.
The self-selection constraint for the high demand consumers is binding (ΛΩ >= 00 ,) .
From the first order condition, we have
ux c HH '( ) = ,( 9 )
ux c ux ux LL
H
H









Since for L  >  0, ΓΩ ==0 eq. (7) shows that Φα H is larger than unity, the first order
conditions (9) and (10) imply a less than first best efficient consumption for the L type and an
efficient consumption for the H type.
The self-selection constraint for the low demand consumers is binding (ΛΩ => 00 ,) .
The first order conditions yield
ux c ux ux HH LH LL '( ) '( ) '( ) =+ − Ω (11)
ux c LL '( ) = . (12)
When the L-type consumer is indifferent between the contracts offered (i.e. Ω> 0 ), and the
H-type consumer prefers his own contract, tt xx HL H L >> ,  is required. Together with
condition (11), this implies that the high demand consumer consumes 'too much'. Intuitively,
if (4d) is binding, then it is better to increase high demand consumers' welfare by offering an7
'excessive' amount of xH than by reducing tH. The reason is that the first measure is better
suited to deter low demand consumers from buying the contract designed for H types.
Figure 1 illustrates why all three cases may appear. It depicts the sets of indifference
curves for the L and H types, respectively. The slope of the indifference curves measures the
marginal willingness to pay for x. Since income effects are assumed to be absent, the
indifference curves' slopes are only dependent on the amount of x and the consumer's type.
The single crossing property guarantees that, for any x, H's indifference curves are steeper than
L's curves. For simplicity the figure assumes αα LH == 1.
Figure 1. Contestable self-selection contracts
Consider first a monopoly without entry. Here the monopolist will provide a pair of
contracts like A and D. The low demand consumer is on her reservation utility UL and she
consumes less than the first best efficient quantity xL
*, i.e. at A the slope of the indifference
curve UL is larger than c. The self-selection restriction for type H is binding and his contract
D yields the same utility as contract A would. Now consider free entry. Because of
contestability, the monopolist will earn zero profit. Moreover, it must not be possible for an8
entrant to offer a contract which is strictly preferred by one group and which breaks even. To
reduce profits the monopolist may either increase H's welfare, or L's welfare, or both. Figure 1
assumes that L keeps her reservation utility. Then, which constraint is binding depends on the
exact cost structure. If, for given marginal cost c, fixed cost is high and therefore profits were
low under the non-contestable monopoly, then the new utility level of H (due to a decrease of
tH) could be at UH
2  and the resulting contract for L would shift from A to B. xL would increase
but would still be inefficiently low. If, because of low fixed cost, monopoly profits in the no-
entry case were higher, the reduction of tH may lead to a utility level like UH
3 . In this case the
relevant indifference curves intersect between the lines xx LL
** −  and xx HH
** − . Neither
restriction (4c) nor (4d) is binding and L's contract C implies a first best efficient quantity of
xL
*. Finally, disposal of very high monopoly profits may lead to the contract pair (C,G), for
which (4d) is binding but (4c) is not. In this case a distortion at the top emerges: ux c H '( )< .
By assumption, all three contract pairs imply zero profit. Furthermore, in all three case
one group's utility is maximised given the other group's utility. Therefore, profitable entry by a
firm which tries to attract both consumer types is ruled out. However, it has been emphasised
above that not just any solution of (4) is a sustainable industry configuration. A stable solution
must also comply with Restrictions 1 and 2 which are sufficient conditions to rule out that an
entrant can profitably attract a single consumer group. Note that (C,G) complies with
Restriction 2 as long as H pays slightly more than his variable cost. This is indeed the case in
Figure 1. To see this, split the consumers' total payments for the contracts C and G into
components which represent participation in fixed cost ( , ) FF L
C
H
G  and components which







G −−. The slope c of the cost function is used
for this separation of total payments. Because of the zero profit condition,  FF L
C
H
G +  equals F.
If a firm tried to supply only the L consumer with her optimal amount xL
* , L would have to
bear both total fixed cost F and variable cost which equals tF L
C
L
C − . This gives L a lower
utility than the contract C as long as  FH
G is positive.
Note that L's marginal willingness to pay is larger than, or equal to, marginal cost in all
contract pairs considered. Combined with the fact that L is at her reservation utility, this
implies that tL is larger than the variable cost caused by the quantity consumed by L, i.e.9
tc x LL >⋅ . Therefore, all three pairs of contracts [(B,E); (C,F); (C,G)] comply with Restriction
1 (E, F and G lie above the hatched area) and form a contestable market equilibrium. No
entrant can lure away the H-type consumer even though he may be forced to take more than
the first best quantity.
In the case of pair (C,G) the monopolist could increase L's utility level somewhat, say
to level UL
1. At the same time, however, tH must be increased to fulfil the zero profit
restriction. This obviously reduces H's utility. Although the equilibrium (K,F) provides first
best quantities, the incumbent is not forced by competitive pressure to move from (C,G) to
(K,F). This clearly introduces some arbitrariness as the utility levels and quantities are not
exactly determined. Similarly, as long as Restriction 1 and the zero profit condition is
satisfied, the monopolist could move from (B,E) to a pair of contracts which increases L's
utility but lowers her consumption of x.
If, in the case of restricted entry, the monopolist can profitably serve both consumer
groups (i.e. if it is profitable to offer contract pair (A,D) in Figure 1), then there is a infinite
set of equilibria under contestability. The reason is that, within bounds, the incumbent can
increase  U L
0  in the maximisation problem (4) beyond the L-type's reservation utility U L
without fearing entry. The loss in profits can be compensated by a reduction of H-type's
utility. The bounds within which this can be done are set by Restriction 1 and 2 and by the H-
type's reservation utility.
The discussion may be summarised in the following way.
Proposition 1: If in a no-entry monopoly both consumer groups were served profitably, then
there will be a continuum of sustainable industry configurations (equilibria) under
contestability.
Proposition 2: A contestable market equilibrium with self-selection contracts may either
provide (a) an inefficiently low quantity to L types and a first best quantity to H types, or (b)
an inefficiently high quantity for H types and an efficient quantity to L types, or (c) a first best
quantity for both groups.
Proposition 2 can be proven by constructing a simple numerical case.10
Example 1: Consider the example where ux LL =
05 . ,  ux HH =⋅ 15
05 .
. , αα LH == 1, c = 1. The
first-best optimal quantities then are xx LH == .; . 25 5625. To ease restriction (4d) as much as
possible, set U L
0 0 =  (which implies tx c LL >  and therefore satisfies Restriction 1). Then, with
first best quantities and zero profit, constraint (4c) is violated for F > .5625. Hence, in a firm's
optimal policy from Λ> 0, uc L' >  holds. Since the social value of the first best production
level is positive as long as F <.8125, according to (7) and (10) in the range
.. 5625 8125 << F supply for low demand consumers is inefficiently low. If U L
0 0 = , neither
(4c) nor (4d) is violated for first best quantities if . . 4375 5625 << F . A first best outcome
indeed evolves. In the range . . 25 4375 << F  first best quantities violated (4d), and this
indicates 'overconsumption' by the H-type consumer. Restriction 2 is complied with as long as
F exceeds .25. !
Policy Implications
The maximisation problem (4) is very similar to a central planner's problem if the planner and
the firm have identical information. This raises the question of whether beneficial policy
measures exist. In a Kaldor-Hicks sense, the government could possibly improve the outcome
if it levied a uniform tax which is then used to ease a binding constraint. For example, in the
equilibrium (B,E) of Figure 1, the government could subsidise the contract which offers more
of good x. This could shift point E downwards and would enable the firm to increase xL
without violating the self-selection constraint. The problem of such a policy is that the firm
might as well use the subsidisation of contract E to increase the L type's utility. While this
would increase L's utility, it would lower L's consumption of x. Therefore, to guarantee a
Kaldor-Hicks improvement, the government must, for example, make the subsidy conditional
on a reduction of tH. A similar argument applies if the constraint (4d) is binding in the market
equilibrium.
Another possible reason for government intervention arises from the indeterminacy of
the market result. Although the firm's maximisation problem (4) looks like a beneficial
government's problem, the government may not share the firm's preferences about the value of11
the low demand consumers' utility level, UL
0. In other words, the government may wish to
attribute the fixed cost differently from a private firm.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper links the literature on contestable markets with the work on optimal contracts. The
choice of optimal self-selection contracts by a monopolist was shown to imply a certain
arbitrariness. Cost and demand structures which create high profits in the case of restricted
entry enable a firm to supply first-best quantities in a contestable market. However, a distorted
equilibrium in which one consumer group's marginal willingness to pay is not equal to
marginal cost is also a sustainable outcome. For example, if only small profits are possible in
the case of restricted entry, then the monopolist under free entry can potentially increase the
inefficiently small quantity low demand consumers want to buy but may not be able to
provide first best quantities. Perhaps the most interesting result is that, in a contestable
monopoly, high demand consumers may be forced to consume too much of the good, i.e. their
marginal willingness to pay falls short of marginal cost. This occurs if the monopolist has a
preference for making the high demand consumers well off. Overconsumption then is a device
to deter low demand consumers from buying the high demand consumers' contract.12
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